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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the civil rights movement, the placement of covenants,
conditions, and restrictions within titles that prohibited the habitation,
use, or ownership of real property by specific religious or racial groups
was an accepted practice.' The Fair Housing Act of 19682 rendered these
restrictions unenforceable with regard to the housing market. 3 The legacy
of racially restrictive covenants, however, lives on in Washington where
many of these unenforceable covenants still remain in the language of
titles to land. 4 Consequently, for a variety of reasons, including the po-
tential for offending particular racial or ethnic groups as well as the
social repercussions of purchasing real estate in an area perceived to be
unpleasantly exclusionary, these covenants should be removed from both
title and public record.5
Despite legislative action to enable a wide array of individuals, in-
cluding those with minimal property rights,6 to strike racially restrictive
° J.D. candidate, 2007, Seattle University School of Law; M.P.A., Evans School of Public Affairs,
University of Washington, 2004; M.A.I.S., Jackson School on International Studies, University of
Washington, 2004; B.S., Biology & Philosophy majors, Chemistry minor, Albertson College of
Idaho, 1999. The author would like to thank the following: Debaprasad Majumdar, my father, and
Devki S. Saraiya, my friend, for physically escorting me to visit Seattle University and encouraging
me; Catherine Majumdar, my mother, and Renee Majumdar, my wife, for their enduring emotional
support; and Niknaz Bukovcan for numerous comments and for law school camaraderie. Special
thanks to the law firm of Carney Badley Spellman for giving me the initial opportunity to investigate
the subject of this article.
1. See generally Joshua L. Farrell, The FHA's Origins: How its Valuation Method Fostered
Racial Segregation and Suburban Sprawl, II J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMTY. DEV. L. 374 (2002).
2. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968).
3. See 2.13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.9 n.73 (2d ed. 2005).
4. Lomet Tumbull, Homeowners Find Records Still Hold Blot of Racism, SEATTLE TIMES,
June 3, 2005, at A 1.
5. Id.
6. For example, those rights associated with occupancy that a tenant might possess.
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covenants from titles and public record,7 there has been very little written
about the process itself. Given the ubiquitous nature of such covenants in
Washington,8 this article aims to provide attorneys the knowledge to ef-
fectively remove racially restrictive covenants without affecting other,
beneficial covenants.
Part II of this Comment will begin by examining the history of ra-
cially restrictive covenants, specifically the nature of covenants and the
role of the federal government in both spreading and hindering the usage
of such covenants. Part III will discuss the legal underpinnings of what
makes such covenants unenforceable in Washington, and the best proc-
esses an attorney can use to remove them.
Part IV will discuss a recent case that has significantly altered the
collateral consequences of attempting to destroy racially restrictive cove-
nants upon other associated covenants.9 As a result, those seeking to re-
tain the benefits of other covenants associated with the land should no
longer fear that an entire set of beneficial covenants will be invalidated
due to a specific challenge against a racially restrictive provision. Al-
though the Washington Supreme Court has made this abundantly clear in
the case of textually separate covenants, it has left open the question of
multiple restrictions that are not textually distinct.'0
Part V provides an analysis of Washington courts' logic and pre-
vailing policy, and that of other jurisdictions that have tackled this issue,
and Part V also argues that Washington courts would likely allow the
racially restrictive portions of covenants to be excised from a document
without endangering affiliated covenants, regardless of how the cove-
nants are structured.
II. A HISTORY OF RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
This Part first examines the history of covenants in general and
their evolution under American jurisprudence. Next, this Part examines
the influence and role of the federal government in both spreading and
hampering the usage of racially restrictive covenants.
A. Covenants in General
A covenant is a promise or obligation contained in a binding in-
strument of contract such as a deed." If a covenantor fails to fulfill
a promise, the covenantee may enforce a covenant in court. The
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006).
8. Turnbull, supra note 4.
9. Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322 (2005).
10. Id.
11. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 391-93 (8th ed. 2004).
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covenantor's side of the promise is called the "burden" side, and the
covenantee's side is called the "benefit" side. 12 A covenant takes the
form of a promise to perform or abstain from an action affecting the land,
relating in some way to the property owner's legal interests. 13
Covenants come in a myriad of forms, and stem from centuries old
English common law. A "running" covenant can descend to successors
in interest,14 such as future owners or assignees of the land, and can be
put in action by or levied against such successors. 15 Running covenants
are found in two general forms, real and equitable, and the latter are
commonly called "equitable servitudes."' 16 Breaches of real covenants are
subject to damages, and one who has breached a covenant may be forced
to pay money damages.' 7 Equitable servitudes, on the other hand, may be
equitably enforced, meaning a court can award an injunction or an order
for specific performance. 18
Real covenants arose earlier in history, first appearing in English
common law at the King's Bench in 1583.19 Equitable covenants, or eq-
uitable servitudes, are a relatively late legal development, arising out of
an English Chancery Court decision in 1848.20 Prior to its importation
from English law, American courts had formed "indigenous theories that
incorporated both a doctrine of real covenants and of equitable restric-
21tions" similar to equitable covenants.
A major difference in distinguishing between the two categories is
that, unlike an equitable servitude, a real covenant requires horizontal
privity, meaning that a land transfer between a grantor and grantee is ex-
pressly tied to the original promise.22 Though the language stems from
English court usage, the development of these concepts in American law
12. 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: REAL ESTATE:
PROPERTY LAW § 3.1 (2d ed. 2004).
13. Id.
14. More formally known as a "covenant running with the land." See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 393.
15. Id.
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 393, 579; STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra note
12, at § 3.1.
17. STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra note 12, at § 3.9.
18. William F. Walsh, Covenants Running With the Land, 21 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 28, 33 (1946).
19. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B. 1583).
20. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774,41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
21. STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra note 12, at § 3.1 n.4 (citing Uriel Reichman, Toward a Uni-
fied Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1188-1211 (1982)); see, e.g., Whittendon Mfg.
Co. v. Staples, 41 N.E. 441, 445 (Mass. 1895) (wherein the court noted that "we see no good reason
why ... an easement or a servitude calling for the performance of positive acts may not also be
created").
22. William B. Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861,
897 (1977).
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was not entirely identified with the subject matter distinctions that might
be historically assumed in English courts by use of the words servitude
or covenant.23 For example, in the formative period of American land-
use law, the most widely used forms of covenants were those aimed at
restricting land uses between neighbors.2 4 In particular, the greatest con-
cern of land owners and courts was working out a theory that either al-
lowed neighbors to enforce a promise against the other, or to allow a
subdivision association to enforce promises against the owners.25
These restrictive covenants were once considered a form of spu-
rious easement by American courts, but restrictive covenants have been
treated as equitable servitudes under modem case law. 26 Restrictive
covenants are now synonymous with equitable servitudes, as courts hold
the requirement of privity is not necessary.27 Consequently, despite the
nomenclature used, racially restrictive covenants are actually equitable
servitudes, given that horizontal privity is not needed when a group of
landowners individually agree to such a restriction and that courts favor
interpretations of equitable servitudes over real covenants.28 For the pur-
poses of this Comment, however, the term covenant will be used for both
equitable servitudes and real covenants, although the term is most often
used to refer only to real covenants.
Given that a basic principle of property law is the free alienability
and use of land, it is important to consider that although covenants en-
cumber titles in some fashion, they are often used to "make land more
marketable and improve its value."2 9 Being mindful of free alienability,
Washington courts have held that "restrictive covenants, being in deroga-
tion of the common law right to use land for all lawful purposes, will not
23. See Reichman, supra note 21, at 1181.
24. See id.
25. Letter from John W. Weaver, Professor, Seattle University School of Law, to Rajeev
Majumdar (Nov. 20, 2005) (on file with author).
26. Cf Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors Ltd., 734 So. 2d 379, 385 n.8 (Fla. 1999)
(citing Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla.
1955) (wherein the Florida Supreme Court stated that restrictive covenants are defined as equitable
servitudes under modem law)).
27. Id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 393; see also Note, Covenants Running
With the Land Viable Doctrine or Common-Law Relic?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 178-80 (1978);
see also Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Co., 164 N.E. 2d 832, 835 (N.Y. 1959) (wherein New
York held that affirmative obligations could run with the land without a requirement of privity).
28. Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 886. One rationale put forward as to why American courts
began to favor interpretations of equitable servitudes over real covenants was that in matters of land
usage, where the restrictions are in place as part of a "common scheme to be enforced for the mutual
benefit of all," the receipt of monetary damages in a court of law is an inadequate remedy to main-
tain the common understanding. See Walsh, supra note 18, at 45-46.
29. Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 886.
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be extended to any use not clearly expressed, and doubts must be
resolved in favor of the free use of land. 3 °
B. Racially Restrictive Covenants and Federal Influence
The practice of using racially restrictive covenants was once wide-
spread throughout the United States and arose in the early twentieth cen-
tury as a method of protecting the "value" of residential property.3I Ex-
tensive use of racially restrictive covenants in the Seattle area-where
relatively dense populations of minorities have existed in comparison to
most of Washington-began in the 1920s.32 In particular, these racially
restrictive covenants applied primarily to "citizens of Negro or Oriental
ancestry and (in some cases) Jews. 3 3 As in most Western states, the ra-
cially restrictive covenants in Washington also targeted Native Ameri-
cans, Pacific Islanders, and people of Mexican ancestry.34 The targeting
of African Americans and East Asians in particular appears to follow a
trend of local responses throughout the West towards influx populations
of non-whites.35 For example, in California's Imperial Valley, an influx
of Punjabi farmers in the early twentieth century led to a bar on selling
land to "Hindoos" through laws passed by local government.36
The federal government tackled racially restrictive covenants both
through the courts and through legislation. This Part will now explore
Supreme Court decisions that invalidated public usage of such restric-
tions. Then, this Part will examine how the federal government helped
promulgate the usage of private racially restrictive covenants. Finally,
this Part will outline a national policy shift that led to the widespread
condemnation of such restrictions.
30. Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 621, 934 P.2d 669, 675 (1997).
31. See generally Farrell, supra note 1.
32. See Terry Pettus, Seattle is Blighted by Restrictive Covenants, NEW WORLD, Jan. 15, 1948,
at 1.
33. Id.
34. Seattle Civil Rights and Labor History Project, Segregated Seattle, http://depts.washington.
edu/civilr/segregated.htm (last visited May 14, 2007).
35. Id.
36. See generally KAREN ISAKSEN LEONARD, MAKING ETHNIC CHOICES: CALIFORNIA'S
PUNJABI MEXICAN AMERICANS (1992). This source details the fascinating history of Punjabi mi-
grants to California. Id. The farmers, labeled as "Hindoos" despite their varied religious backgrounds
as Sikhs, Muslims, as well as Hindus, were prohibited from buying farm land in the Imperial Valley.
Id. The immigrants were mostly male, and married Mexican women refugees from the Mexican
Revolution who were allowed to possess and take title to land. Id. The indirect result of the restric-
tions and the direct result of over 500 inter-racial marriages between these two groups produced a
unique hybrid community known as Mexican Hindus, which has remained a successful farming
community over several generations. Id. See also Pioneer Asian Indian Immigration to the Pacific
Coast, Mexican Hindu, http://www.sikhpioneers.org/mexhindu.html (last visited May 14, 2007).
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1. Early Supreme Court Decisions
Not long after the initial proliferation of racially restrictive cove-
nants, the U.S. Supreme Court, relying on the Fourteenth Amendment,
put an end to state-sponsored promulgation of racially restrictive cove-
nants. In 1917, Buchanan v. Warley invalidated racial-segregation ordi-
nances like those seen in the Imperial Valley.37 The plaintiff, a seller of a
parcel of property, challenged a Louisville city ordinance that would
deny an African American purchaser from taking possession, which was
a requirement of the sale.3 s The title of the ordinance read as follows:
An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white
and colored races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve the pub-
lic peace and promote the general welfare, by making reasonable
provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of separate
blocks, for residences, places of abode, and places of assembly by
white and colored people respectively. 39
The Supreme Court held that while the authority of the state to pass
laws in the exercise of the police power for the promotion of the public
health, safety and welfare is broad in nature, such authority "cannot jus-
tify the passage of a law or ordinance which runs counter to the limita-
tions of the federal Constitution." 40 Property, along with life and liberty,
is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment from usurpation by the
states without due process of law, and states cannot place arbitrary re-
straints on the alienation of property.41 Relying on Blackstone, the Su-
preme Court defined property as "consist[ing] of the free use, enjoyment,
and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution
save by the law of the land. 4 2 Accordingly, the Court held that the right
to acquire, use, and dispose of property was protected by the Constitu-
tion, and, as a result, all citizens of the United States have the right to
purchase property and use it without laws discriminating against them on
account of their race.43
Although Buchanan ended the era of state-sponsored racial re-
strictions on property, the question of private covenants was left wide
open. No law restricted private parties from attaching racially restrictive
covenants to land and limiting alienability with regard to race. 44 In 1926,
37. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).
38. See id. at 69-70.
39. Id. at 70 (quoting City of Louisville Ordinance, approved May 11, 1914).
40. Id. at 74.
41. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
42. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74.
43. Id. at 74, 81-82 (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898)).
44. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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the Supreme Court endorsed this practice in Corrigan v. Buckley.45 The
issue in Corrigan paralleled Buchanan in that it involved a transfer of
property between a white property owner and an African American
buyer, where property owners sought to prevent the buyer from taking
title or possession due to a racially restrictive covenant.46 Unlike in Bu-
chanan, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply
because it has "reference to State action exclusively, and not to any ac-
tion of private individuals. 47 Thus, the Corrigan Court concluded that
racially restrictive covenants established by private property owners were
not in violation of the Constitution, because "contracts entered into by
private individuals in respect to the control and disposition of their own
property" were valid.48
2. The Federal Housing Administration's Role in Proliferation
Corrigan took on increased significance with the establishment of
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934, which spurred the
growth of racially restrictive covenants across the country.49 The purpose
of the FHA was to provide mortgage loan guarantees in order to facilitate
home ownership, and in pursuing this purpose the FHA would advise
developers on what factors to use to determine whether a neighborhood
would receive financing.50 The FHA's Underwriting Manual contained
guidelines for retaining property values and community desirability:
If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties
shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes.
Further, appraisers were warned of the dangers of infiltration of
"inharmonious racial or nationality groups." As a means of enforc-
ing this segregation, the Underwriting Manual recommended
45. Id.
46. Id. at 327-28. In 1921, thirty land owners, including the defendant, Corrigan, recorded a
racially restrictive covenant that stated "no part of these properties should ever be used or occupied
by, or sold, leased or given to, any person of the negro race or blood; and that this covenant should
run with the land and bind their respective heirs and assigns for twenty-one years from and after its
date." Id. at 327. In 1922, Corrigan executed a contract of sale with the defendant, Curtis. Id. Corri-
gan knew Curtis was black, and Curtis knew of the covenant, but both intended to carry forward
with the sale over the objections of the other parties to the covenant. Id. at 327-28. The plaintiffs
sought an injunction preventing the defendants from carrying the contract of sale into effect, or to
delay the conveyance until the racially restrictive covenant expired. Id. at 328.
47. Id. at 330 (citing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 639 (1883)).
48. Id. at 331.
49. Farrell, supra note 1, at 381.
50. Id.
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"subdivision regulations and suitable restrictive covenants" as an
excellent method to maintain neighborhood stability.
51
Due to the FHA's criteria for financing, racially diverse neighbor-
hoods were excluded from receiving insured mortgages. Even if such an
area received FHA insurance, its appraised value was substantially di-
minished. Consequently, properties in racially diverse neighborhoods
were effectively valued "at zero because, in the Manual's words, those
neighborhoods' 'racial aspects render[ed] the locations actually
noncompetitive.'53
Because of the diminished values placed on racially diverse
neighborhoods by the FHA, a model form for racially restrictive cove-
nants promulgated by the FHA became a tool for developers and land
owners to protect their property values.54 This had direct ramifications in
Washington, particularly in Seattle, where the Boeing Company devel-
oped vast tracts of land. 55 In developing much of the North Seattle area,
Boeing made extensive use of racially restrictive covenants as prescribed
by the FHA Manual.56
For example, the neighborhood of Innis Arden in Shoreline, Wash-
ington, was subdivided by the Boeing Company and created with a ra-
cially restrictive community covenant. The language of the community
covenant still exists today, and the "clause, 'no person other than one of
the white race shall be permitted to occupy any property in said addition
.' is still part of part of the covenant that families purchasing property
today in Innis Arden are required to sign. ' 58 Currently, the document lists
the clause that contains the racially restrictive language as "invalidated,"
but it still exists on the formal covenants. 59 For several years, many
community members in Innis Arden gathered signatures in an attempt to
51. Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal
Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 617, 626 (1999)
(quoting KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 208 (1985); DOUGLAS A. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 54 (1993)).
52. Farrell, supra note 1, at 381-82.
53. Id. at 381 (citing FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, UNDERWRITING MANUAL § 1304,
at 904 (1938)).
54. Turnbull, supra note 4, at Al.
55. Interview with Steve Calandrillo, Attorney for Defendants/Appellants in Viking Props.,
Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322 (2005), in Seattle, Wa. (Nov. 1,2005).
56. Id.
57. Seattle Civil Rights and Labor History Project, Innis Arden-A Restricted Residential
Community, http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/Innis%2OArden.htm (last visited May 14, 2007).
58. Id. (citing Innis Arden Covenant, No. 3187136 Vol. 1992, Recorded: August 28, 1941,
available at http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/images/innes%20arden/current%20covenantl.htm
[hereinafter Innis Arden Covenant].
59. Innis Arden Covenant, supra note 58, at cl. 15.
1102 [Vol. 30:1095
Racially Restrictive Covenants in Washington
remove the language from the community covenant, but not until 2006
was the community finally able to gather enough signatures to do so.60
Many other communities and individual properties hold similar
covenants. 61 Another prominent example also originates from an FHA-
guided Boeing development, the Boeing Subdivision, which was recently
the subject of scrutiny in Viking Properties, Inc. v. Holm, discussed
below in Part 111.62
3. A National Policy Shift
It was not until February 1950, two years after racial covenants
were declared unenforceable and contrary to public policy by the Su-
preme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer,63 that the FHA officially stopped
encouraging racially restrictive covenants. 64
In Shelley, the Court rendered racially restrictive covenants unen-
forceable because the U.S. Constitution conferred upon no individual a"right to demand action by a State which results in the denial of equal
protection of the laws to other individuals. 65 There, two cases were
consolidated for the review. In both cases, property owners brought suit
against African American families in order to restrain them from taking
possession of property they had purchased subject to the terms of a re-
strictive covenant.66 The Court, however, did not find merit in the asser-
tions of the white property owners, who claimed that the refusal of the
courts to enforce terms of the racially restrictive covenant against Afri-
can American purchasers was a denial of equal protection of the laws.67
Significantly, the Court held that it was unquestionable that "the power
of the State to create and enforce property interests must be exercised
within the boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment," which
rendered racially restrictive covenants wholly unenforceable. 68
Despite the ruling in Shelley, the "lingering effects of discrimina-
tory policies that [lasted] for decades after World War II," essentially
60. Innis Arden Club, http://www.innisarden.com/index.html (last visited May 14, 2007).
Currently, all three subdivisions have collected just enough signatures to remove the restrictions;
ironically, however, this comes after the passage of recent legislation discussed below, which gives
the board of a homeowners association standing to remove such covenants. 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws
Ch. 58 (S.B. 6169).
61. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 3, Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118
P.3d 322 (2005), 2004 WL 3155201.
62. Id.
63. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
64. Nier, supra note 51, at 626.
65. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 22; cf Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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made it impossible for people of color to get FHA mortgages. 69 The Fair
Housing Act of 1968 served to add federal weight to the Shelley ruling
by prohibiting discrimination with regards to sales, rentals, and the fi-
nancing of housing. 70 The Fair Housing Act of 1968 was passed as a
result of the outrage over the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., who, in addition to other issues, had called attention to the racial ine-
qualities and barriers in obtaining housing.7 President Lyndon Johnson
urged Congress to pass the act, which specifically barred discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion and national origin.72 More impor-
tantly, in the context of already unenforceable racially restrictive cove-
nants, it allowed third-party standing to individuals to pursue claims
against illegal enforcement of such covenants, even if they were not
personally discriminated against. 73
III. WASHINGTON'S STATUTORY REMEDIES
AND INTERPRETATION OF PROCEDURE
This Part will first look at Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
49.60.224, which defines what restrictions on property are void under
Washington law and to whom the law applies. Then, this Part will dis-
cuss RCW 49.60.227, the statutory procedure that the legislature has en-
acted to remove racially restrictive covenants, and proper procedural ap-
proaches to the matter.
A. RCW 49.60.224-Voiding
After the passage of the Fair Housing Act, state legislatures fol-
lowed suit, passing their own versions of what was then already federal
law.7 4 In 1969, the Washington legislature enacted RCW 49.60.224,
which voids discriminatory provisions in real property contracts. The
69. William A. Johnson, Jr., Mayor, City of Rochester, Speech at Hobart and William Smith
College in Memory of Martin Luther King Jr.: Redeem the Dream (Jan. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.hws.edu/news/speakers/transcripts/j ohnson mlk2005 .asp.
70. See generally Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2007).
71. IRVING BERNSTEIN, GUNS OR BUTTER: THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 495-99
(1996); Johnson, supra note 69.
72. BERNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 499. It should also be noted that Richard M. Nixon and New
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, both Republicans running for President in an attempt to unseat
the Democratic hold on the Presidency, joined President Johnson in supporting the Fair Housing Act.
The Civil Rights Act was amended in 1974 to add sex to the list of protected classes, and in 1988 to
add disability and familial status. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. Law No.
93-383, 88 Stat 633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5307 (2007)); Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. Law No. 100-430, 102 Stat 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (2007)).
73. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602, 3608, 3613 (2007); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.9 n.73 (2005).
74. See, e.g., Michigan's Fair Housing Act of 1968, 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts 112.
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statute has been expanded several times to protect additional classes from
discrimination7 5 and now states in relevant part:
Every provision in a written instrument relating to real property
which purports to forbid or restrict the conveyance, encumbrance, occu-
pancy, or lease thereof to individuals of a specified race, creed, color,
sex, national origin, sexual orientation, families with children status, or
with any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained
dog guide or service animal by a blind, deaf, or physically disabled per-
son, and every condition, restriction, or prohibition, including a right of
entry or possibility of reverter, which directly or indirectly limits the use
or occupancy of real property on [these grounds] is void.76
Additionally, under this statute it is an unfair practice to "attempt to
honor such a provision in the chain of title. 77 Consequently, any attempt
to deny the sale of such a formerly restricted property to members of the
formerly prohibited target race(s) can have consequences including
prosecution under the Unfair Business Practices-Consumer Protection
Act.78
There has also been some controversy over the word "individuals"
in the statutory language, and Washington courts have held that the
meaning is not confined to natural persons. In Niemann v. Vaugh Com-
munity Church, a member of a church attempted to block a sale of church
property by enforcing language contained in the trust controlling the
church's property, which prohibited the use of land by any party other
than the church community in perpetuity. 79 The court in Niemann found
that while RCW chapter 49.60 consistently uses "individual" to mean a
natural person, the church, while not covered under this statute, could
still convey the land to another party. 80 The court based its rationale on
the fact that the purchasers could possibly be members of classes pro-
tected by RCW 49.60.224.81 Though the harm in this case was to a pos-
sible, future unidentified buyer, that harm could have potentially in-
cluded people of various races; consequently, any titleholder, including a
75. The language regarding "national origin" and "or the presence of any sensory, mental, or
physical handicap" was inserted in 1979. "Sex," "families with children status," "or physical disabil-
ity," and "or the use of a trained guide dog or service dog by a blind, deaf, or physically disabled
person" were added in 1993, again following the Federal lead in its amendments of the Fair Housing
Act. In 1997, "dog guide or service animal" replaced "guide or service dog." In 2006, "sexual orien-
tation" was added. 1979 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 127, § 10; 1997 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 69, § 8; 1997
Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 271, § 16; 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 16.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.224(1) (2006).
77. Id. § 49.60.224(2).
78. Id. § 19.86.090.
79. Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 118 Wash. App. 824,828, 77 P.3d 1208, 1209 (2003).
80. 1d. at 833-34, 77 P.3d at 1212-13.
81. Id.
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business entity, has standing under this statute, and any landowner may
take action to remove such a restriction.82
B. RCW49.60.227-Removing
Though it is not clear whether RCW 49.60.224 provides a remedy
for provisions formed before 1969, the Washington Supreme Court has
held that declaratory judgment action can be obtained under RCW
49.60.227, regardless of whether the provision originated before 1969.
RCW 49.60.227 authorizes "Declaratory Judgment Actions" that have
been created to strike the void discriminatory provisions from real prop-
erty contracts. 83 This is an in rem action 84 and is applicable whenever
there is "a written instrument contain[ing] a provision that is void by rea-
son of RCW 49.60.224." 85 The Washington legislature passed this statute
in 1987 on the rationale that discriminatory covenants, in addition to be-
ing void, are contrary to public purpose, and that the "continued exis-
tence of these covenants and restrictions is repugnant to many property
owners and diminishes the free enjoyment of their property.' 86 Accord-
ing to RCW 49.60.227, a court receiving such an action and concurring
that there is a void provision under RCW 49.60.224 should issue an order
striking the void provision from public record and title.87
While the Washington Supreme Court has not explicitly held
whether RCW 49.60.224 provides a remedy to void provisions formed
before 1969, it has noted that RCW Chapter 49.60 is broad and remedial
in nature, intended to confront and remedy a menace to the institutions
and foundations of democracy in the form of discrimination.88 Following
this rationale, any discriminatory covenant may be stricken from title and
public record through a declaratory judgment action, regardless of
whether it originated before or after 1969.89
An action under this statute to remove a racially restrictive
covenant should be brought in superior court in the county where the
property is located, and may be done by any designated "necessary
party," including the owner, occupant, or tenant of the property, as well
82. See id. at n.4.
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006). This Comment is current with legislative updates
effective June 1, 2006 authorized by 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws Ch. 58 (S.B. 6169)).
84. In rem is Latin for "against a thing" and is an action "involving or determining the status of
a thing, and therefore the rights of persons generally with respect to that thing." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 809.
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006).
86. 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 56, § 2.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006).
88. Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 927, 784 P.2d 1258, 1265 (1990) (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.60.010 (2006)).
89. See id.
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as any homeowners association that may govern it.90 As a result of the
action, the court shall "enter an order striking the void provisions from
the public records and eliminating the void provisions from the title or
lease of the property described in the complaint." 9' There is also a re-
quired court fee that is set under RCW 36.18.012, which currently stands
at twenty dollars.92
In these cases, judgment is a matter of law, and a wide range of des-
ignated parties associated with the property can demand the covenant be
stricken and removed from public record.93 As such, the most expedi-
tious practice is to have a motion for summary judgment attached to the
complaint for declaratory action.94 In the alternative, given the simple
and direct nature of the action, it may be possible to expedite the matter
even further by approaching a court commissioner to hear the case ex
parte with the complaint for declaratory action and a prepared order for
signature. 95
As a final cautionary note.for those pursuing this remedy, when
searching for a racially restrictive covenant, lawyers should be aware that
title companies often blank out the discriminatory language in covenants
when making copies after a title search. 96 There is no consistent industry
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006). One does not have to be an owner in fee simple-
mere occupancy or tenancy is satisfactory for the required standing. This raises the question of the
adverse possessor, and I surmise that because the legislature has judged these covenants to be against
"public purpose" and "repugnant," the adverse possessor's mere occupancy would allow her to bring
such a claim. Incidentally, this would serve as good evidence of open and notorious possession, a
requirement of adverse possession; it would encourage adverse possessors to carry out desired public
policy in serving their own ends. Id; see generally KELLY KUNSCH , ESTABLISHING TITLE BY
ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1C WASH. PRAC. § 89.4 (Supp. 2005).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006).
92. Id. §§ 49.60.227, 36.18.012(6).
93. See generally id § 49.60.224.
94. Interview with Jon A. Payne, J.D., Principal, and Sandip Soli, J.D., Associate, Carney
Badley Spellman P.S., in Seattle, Washington. (Jun. 21, 2005); see generally WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.60.224 (2006).
95. Interview with Daniel W. Unti, J.D., Principal, Carney Badley Spellman P.S., in Seattle,
Washington. (Jun. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Unti]. Under the Washington constitution and the Revised
Code of Washington, court commissioners are authorized to perform limited functions in superior
courts to hear and determine legal matters. WASH CONST. art. IV, § 23; WASH. REV. CODE § 24.010
(2006). The rulings of court commissioners, however, are subject to review and revision by superior
court judges. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.24.050 (2006). The superior court has unlimited powers of
review and may conduct whatever proceedings it deems necessary to resolve the matter. In re De-
pendency of B.S.S., 56 Wash. App. 169, 171, 782 P.2d 1100, 1101 (1989) (citing In re McGee, 36
Wash. App. 660, 679 P.2d 933 (1984), review denied, 114 Wash. 2d 1018, 791 P.2d 536 (1990)).
The reviewing court is also authorized to determine its own facts based on the record, and its scope
of authority is not limited to the court commissioner's findings. In re Marriage of Dodd, 120 Wash.
App 638, 643, 86 P.3d 801, 804 (2004). Given the broad nature of RCW § 49.60.227, however,
uncontested scenarios would not involve a request for review by a judge.
96. Tumbull, supra note 4, at A13.
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policy, however, and some title companies show the language, or make
attachments indicating such covenants are invalid.97 The original docu-
ments recorded, however, will still bear the language unless amended by
an RCW 49.60.227 action, as described above. 98
IV. PRESERVATION OF ATTACHED BENEFICIAL COVENANTS
This Part outlines the dueling policy interests that arise when land
owners wish to keep beneficial covenants that are unfortunately attached
to racially restrictive covenants. Recently, the Washington Supreme
Court has directly examined this dilemma in Viking v. Holm.99 This Part
discusses the court's analysis in Viking and its holding that racially re-
strictive covenants that are textually separate can be severed. Further,
this Part outlines the shortcomings of Viking and argues that the holding
should be expanded to excise any presence of racial restrictions from
other beneficial covenants, regardless of whether the covenants are
within the same sentence or not.
A. Legal Dilemma: The Destruction of Beneficial Covenants
There can be great reluctance to alter a covenant attached to a title,
especially where there are multiple parts to the covenant.100 While many
homeowners may view racial restrictions as a blemish or repugnant, they
might be loathe to give up other beneficial covenants, such as neighbor-
hood upkeep standards, rights to views, and maximum building
heights.1° l Homeowners purchase and develop properties in reliance on
the continued validity and enforceability of covenants, and the threat of
destruction of these associated covenants is incentive enough to prevent
them from acting to strike language they already understand as void. 10 2
As will be shown below, however, Washington courts have determined
when restrictive covenants can be severed from a title without endanger-
ing other associated beneficial covenants. 0 3
In order for a restrictive covenant to be severable, it must exist in a
form that violates public policy. 0 4 For example, a covenant that wholly
prohibits the use of land would be unreasonable and thus void because it
97. Id.
98. Unti, supra note 95.
99. Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322 (2005).
100. Id. at 117, 118 P.3d at 325.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Thayer v. Thompson, 36 Wash. App. 794, 677 P.2d 787 (1984).
104. See id at 796 (citing Golberg v. Sanglier, 27 Wash. App. 179, 191, 616 P.2d 1239, 1247
(1980), rev'd on other grounds, 96 Wash. 2d 874, 639 P.2d 1347 (1982)).
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would contradict public policy that favors the free alienability of land. 105
Additionally, in order to find that a covenant's purpose is in violation of
public policy, courts require a demonstration of legislative intent to over-
ride contractual property rights. 10 6 In the case of racially restrictive cove-
nants, RCW 49.60.227 demonstrates fulfillment of this premise by the
Washington legislature. 10
7
Still, the matter of destroying other covenants associated with ra-
cially restrictive covenants is problematic as homeowners may be relying
on associated beneficial covenants not void at law. 10 8 Judicial interpreta-
tion of land use policy in Washington, as evidenced by the following
cases, supports the idea that homeowners' benefits from covenants
should be protected. In Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass 'n v.
Witrak, the Washington Supreme Court held that emphasis should be
placed on interpreting covenants so that the collective interests of home-
owners are protected. 109 Strengthening the idea that covenants may have
great value to homeowners, in Riss v. Angel the court noted that "in
Washington the intent, or purpose, of the covenants, rather than free use
of the land, is the paramount consideration in construing restrictive
covenants." 110
These different policy interests create a dilemma. On one hand, any
person associated with a piece of property may bring an action to destroy
and remove from public record any racially restrictive covenants at-
tached to the title of the property in question under RCW 49.60.227. Yet,
on the other hand, there is strong policy in Washington case law indicat-
ing that if some covenants contain benefits that homeowners have relied
upon, then the intent of these covenants should be protected and adhered
to.
105. Id. at 797 (citing 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 674 (1981)).
106. Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. Worthington, 121 Wash. 2d 810, 823, 854 P.2d 1072,
1078 (1993).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006).
108. See, e.g., Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Witrak, 61 Wash. App. 177, 810
P.2d 27 (1991) (homeowners association sought an order against specific homeowners, whose rows
of trees, being over twenty-five feet in height, violated a restrictive covenant precluding erection of
fences over six feet in height).
109. Id. at 181, 810 P.2d at 29.
110. Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 623, 934 P.2d 669, 676 (1997); Here, the court explic-
itly points out language in a New Hampshire holding they find particularly relevant, that the "former
prejudice against restrictive covenants which led courts to strictly construe them is yielding to a
gradual recognition that they are valuable land use planning devices." Id. (citing Joslin v. Pine River
Dev. Corp., 367 A.2d 599, 601 (N.H. 1976)).
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B. Recent Resolution of the Dilemma: Viking v. Holm
The competing interests of wanting to excise racially restrictive
covenants and keeping beneficial covenants was the issue resolved when
King County Superior Court held that an entire covenant, including re-
strictions on housing density, was void because it included among its
elements a racial restriction that was "unenforceable and not severable
from the remainder of the covenant."' 11 In Viking v. Holm, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court overturned the superior court and held that a racially
restrictive portion of the covenant must be severed while continuing to
enforce the beneficial portion of the covenant.'1 12
1. Factual Background
Viking concerned property in the Boeing Subdivision of Shoreline,
Washington, the property being subject to a racially restrictive cove-
nant. 1 3 All of the property owners in the subdivision derive their titles
from sales by the Boeing Company which took place between 1937 and
1941." Each lot in the subdivision was subject to the same restrictive
covenant, which reads as follows:
[1.] This property shall not at any time, directly or indirectly, be
sold, conveyed, rented or leased in whole or in part, to any person
or persons not of the White or Caucasian race. [2.] No person other
than one of the White or Caucasian race shall be permitted to oc-
cupy any portion of any residence tract or of any building thereon,
except a domestic servant actually employed by a White occupant
of such tract and/or building. [3.] No building or structure shall be
erected, constructed, maintained or permitted upon this property ex-
cept a single family, detached private dwelling house on each one-
half acre in area. [4.] As appurtenant to such dwelling house a pri-
vate garage, garden house, pergola, convervatory [sic], servant
quarters or other private appurtenant outbuildings or structures, may
be erected, constructed and maintained." 15
The covenant in its barest essence proscribes racial minorities from
any form of ownership or property interest and imposes a housing den-
sity limitation of no more than one dwelling on each one-half acre. 116
In July 2002, Viking Properties, Inc. (Viking) purchased a 1.46 acre
lot in the Boeing Subdivision, and three months later it demanded the
111. Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 115, 118 P.3d 322, 324 (2005).
112. See generally id.
113. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4, Viking, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322.
114. See id; see also Viking, 155 Wash. 2d at 116, 118 P.3d at 324.
115. Viking, 155 Wash. 2d at 116, 118 P.3d at 324.
116. Id.
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other homeowners (Homeowners) release the entire covenant so that it
could redevelop the lot with more residential units, which it could not do
with the housing density limitation.' 1 7 Every Homeowner rejected
Viking's demand despite being informed that they would be sued by Vi-
king. 11 8 Viking subsequently asked King County Superior Court to de-
clare the covenant unenforceable in its entirety and invalidate it. 119
Toward this end, Viking argued several points with regard to conflict
with new zoning laws. This Comment will focus on Viking's primary
argument: "the covenant's racial restriction is invalid and cannot be sev-
ered from its density limitation. 1 2
0
The court agreed with Viking, holding that the covenant was unen-
forceable based on Viking's reasoning, and entered summary judgment
in their favor.' 21 The Homeowners' motion for reconsideration on proce-
dural grounds was denied, and they appealed to the Washington Supreme
Court. 22
2. Appellant's Challenge
In Viking, the Homeowners argued that "the court should sever the
covenant's invalid racial restrictions and enforce the independently law-
ful building and use restrictions long relied on by the homeowners. 123
Their argument was based on three premises: (1) that courts have long
deferred to private covenants; (2) that the homeowners' collective inter-
ests required enforcement of the valid building and use restrictions; and
(3) that the void racial restrictions operate independently of the rest of
the restrictions.1 24
The Homeowners invoked the traditional deference to private inter-
ests, their collective interests, and the need to protect homeowners' reli-
ance on beneficial covenants. 125 Indeed, the Homeowners made the ar-
gument that beyond protection of their reliance interests, property owners
have a right to restrict the use of their land. 126 Additionally, the
117. Id. at 117, 118 P.3d at 325.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 118, 118 P.3d at 325.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 118-19, 118 P.3d at 325.
123. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 15, Viking, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322. For the
purposes of examining the severing of racially restrictive provisions in covenants, this article will
only survey those portions of the appellate arguments and decisions that apply directly to the issue at
hand.
124. Id. at 15-19.
125. Id. at 15-18.
126. Viking, 155 Wash. 2d at 115, 118 P.3d at 325-26 (citing Mt. Baker Park Club v. Colcock,
45 Wash. 2d 467, 275 P.2d 733 (1954) (affirming trial court order requiring removal of building
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Homeowners argued that restrictive covenants are property rights pro-
tected under Washington's constitution as a contract. 127 They cited to
Article I, Section 23 of the Washington State Constitution which states
that "[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligations of contracts shall ever be passed."'' 28 The problem with this
argument is that if the contract of the covenant is void due to the racial
restrictions, there is no impairment of a valid obligation. Thus, the
Homeowners had to show that the racially restrictive portions of the
covenant were severable.
In arguing that the racially restrictive portions of the covenant were
severable, the Homeowners examined RCW 49.60.224, which voids dis-
criminatory provisions in real property contracts. 129 Specifically, they
highlighted the language that emphasized: "Every provision in a written
instrument relating to real property which purports to forbid or restrict
the conveyance... [or] occupancy... thereof to individuals of a specific
race, creed [or] color .... is void."' 130 Based on this language, the Home-
owners argued that the legislature never intended to void entire written
instruments, but only those portions that were racially restrictive.' 3' Fur-
thermore, the Homeowners pointed out that the statute used the term
"provision" repeatedly, indicating that "by definition [it] presumes the
existence of a larger instrument whose valid terms survive after invalid
terms are stricken."'' 32
Viking responded to the Homeowners' argument that only the
racially restrictive covenants should be severed by claiming that "the
covenant is invalid in its entirety because pervasive racial restrictions are
intertwined with its meaning and because no meaningful restrictions re-
main when racial restrictions are removed.",133 This argument by Viking
was founded on the premise that the racially restrictive portions of the
covenant are dominant, and that there was no severability clause in the
constructed in violation of residential covenant); Hanson v. Hanlv, 62 Wash. 2d 482, 383 P.2d 494
(1963); Granger v. Boulls, 21 Wash. 2d 597, 598, 152 P.2d 325, pin, (1944) (affirming covenant's
limitation for "necessary outbuildings for residence uses")).
127. Id. (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 23; Pierce v. Ne. Lake Wash. Sewer and Water Dist.,
123 Wash. 2d 550, 559-60, 870 P.2d 305, 310-311 (1994) (holding that private view protection
covenant may give rise to inverse condemnation action for view obstruction)).
128. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 23.
129. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 20, Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118
P.3d 322 (2005) (examining WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.224 (2006)).
130. Id. at 20 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.224 (2006)).
131. Id. at 20-21.
132. Id. (analyzing WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.227 (2006).
133. Brief of Respondent at 14, Viking, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322. See also supra note
1112 [Vol. 30:1095
Racially Restrictive Covenants in Washington
covenant. 134 Due to this, Viking argued, there is no rational basis for de-
termining the intent of the covenant. 135 Re-drafting the covenant as an
example, Viking constructed what they termed to be an "absurdly dis-
torted" outcome: "This property may at any time, directly or indirectly,
be sold, conveyed, rented, or leased in whole or in part to any person or
persons."'136 Furthermore, Viking argued that clauses three and four were
predicated on the racially restrictive clauses one and two; in particular
Viking questioned who would be limited to occupying the "servant's
quarters" authorized in the fourth clause, if not the prohibited races in
clauses one and tWo. 13 7
The Homeowner appellants, however, argued that clauses three and
four had clear and unambiguous language from which a separate intent
could be discerned from the racially restrictive intent in clauses one and
two. 138 The Homeowners anchored their arguments on an Alabama case
that looked at separate servant's quarters language that was similar to
clause four in Viking. 139 In the Alabama case, the court held that the lan-
guage was distinct and severable from the racially restrictive portions of
the covenant. 40 Based on policy concerns, the Homeowners also argued
that voiding the entire covenant in this case "merely because it includes
an outmoded racial restriction would impair the contract and property
rights of the Homeowners, who paid value for property in reliance on the
valid building and use restrictions made known to all parties at the time
of purchase.''
3. Court's Resolution
The supreme court weighed both sides of the dilemma and found
that the purposes of clauses one and two were logically distinct from that
of clauses three and four, and that because the clauses were "textually
separate from each other . . . it reasonably follows that the racial
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 17.
137. Id. at 18.
138. ld. at 22 (citing Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wash. 2d 337, 344,
883 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1994)).
139. Id. at 24 (citing Callahan v. Weiland, 279 So. 2d 451 (Ala. 1973)). In Callahan, the lots of
a subdivision were sold with deeds of conveyance that contained several provisions, including: "That
said property shall be used by white persons only, except that any servant or servants employed on
the premises may occupy servants' quarters or house." Callahan, 279 So. 2d at 453.
140. Callahan, 279 So. 2d at 457 ("The racially restrictive covenant bears no relation to the
remaining covenants, and is entirely distinct from the building and use restrictions.").
141. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 25, Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118
P.3d 322 (2005).
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restriction is severable from the remainder of the covenant. ' 42 The court
stated that Viking was correct that where the covenant's meaning is radi-
cally distorted, the covenant would be invalid; but in this case, Viking's
re-construction of the text was "exceptionally strained.' 43 With regard to
strained definitions, the court held that it would interpret covenants liber-
ally using the plain and ordinary meaning of the text 44 in part to avoid
absurd results, 45 and in part because covenants are favored as they
generally make land more marketable and improve value. 146
Regarding the lack of a severance clause in the original covenant,
the court reasoned that though the drafter's intentions regarding sever-
ance cannot be known, intent can be drawn from the ordinary and plain
meaning of the covenant's language. 47 A review of the Boeing Subdivi-
sion covenant by the court yielded two logically distinct purposes:
[T]o exclude racial minorities from ownership or possession of the
land, and to limit the number of principal dwellings to no more than
one for every one-half acre. Not only are these purposes logically
distinct, they are textually separate from each other, with the racial
restriction contained in the first two sentences and the density limi-
tation in the latter two. 14
8
Given the court's identification of two logically discernable and
distinct purposes, it held the racial restriction was severable from the re-
mainder of the covenant as it was both void and textually distinct.149
Additionally, the court agreed with the Homeowners' statutory in-
terpretation, 150 and held that the legislature's repeated use of "provision"
demonstrated that the legislature did not intend to void every written in-
strument containing a racial restriction.151 Consequently, given the
legislative intent, the strong policy of protecting homeowners' collective
interests, and the fact that the clauses were "textually separate from each
other," the court held that the racial restrictions were severable from the
remainder of the covenant. 152
142. Viking, 155 Wash. 2d at 123, 118 P.3d at 328.
143. See id. at 122, 118 P.3d at 327-28.
144. See id. at 121-22, 124, 118 P.3d at 327-29 (citing Stoebuck, supra note 22, at 886).
145. Id. at 122, 118 P.3d at 328 (citing State v. Stannard, 109 Wash. 2d 29, 36, 742 P.2d 1244,
1248 (1987)).
146. Id. at 124, 118 P.3d at 327 (citing Eurick v. Pemco Ins. Co., 108 Wash. 2d 338, 341, 738
P.2d 251, 252 (1987)).
147. Id. at 123, 118 P.3d at 328 (citing Riss v. Angel, 131 Wash. 2d 612, 621, 934 P.2d 669,
675 (1997)).
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S (1948)).
150. Id. (accepting Homeowners' interpretation of WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.224).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 124, 118 P.3d at 328.
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C. The Future: Excising Racial Restrictions
from Textually Unified Covenants
The ruling in Viking presupposes a curious question: whether the
outcome would have been the same had the racially restrictive portions
of the covenant been textually unified with the building density provi-
sions. If a period becomes a comma in a covenant, will that override the
collective interests of homeowners to rely on beneficial covenants, and
render the entire covenant void under RCW 49.60.224? A review of the
Viking court's policies and the general trend in property law indicate the
answer to be no; Washington courts would likely excise racially restric-
tive language in any form from covenants to preserve the valid benefits
in which homeowners share a collective interest.
The Homeowners in Viking cited Alabama's Callahan decision that
said "we see no reason why [the void provision] should not be separable
from the remaining enforceable covenants, which separation would in
nowise affect the validity of the remaining covenants." '15 3 Callahan is
analogous to the facts in Viking, where the court held that language re-
stricting the use of the property to white people was severable from
building restrictions that restricted construction to "a single dwelling
house with necessary outbuildings. 154 Significantly, Callahan reflected
a growing, nationwide trend in post-war America where courts began to
hold that separation of racially restrictive portions of the covenant"would in nowise affect the validity of the remaining covenants," and the
racially restrictive language must be deleted. 155 The Callahan court also
noted that "[a]t least two of our sister state courts have so held, and we
are in accord with such holdings. ' 56
The issue of textual unity has come before courts in other jurisdic-
tions, and has been decided in favor of excising void racially restrictive
portions of specific provisions. 157 For example, in Hawthorne v. Realty
Syndicate, Inc., the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a restrictive
covenant limiting land to residential use only was not wholly void be-
cause of its conjunction with racially restrictive language.' 58 The provi-
sion in question read as follows: "The property shall be used for resi-
dence purposes only and shall be occupied and owned by only people of
the white race.' 59 The court concluded that even where the racial
153. Callahan v. Weiland, 279 So. 2d 451, 457 (Ala. 1973).
154. Id. at 457.
155. Id. at 457.
156. Id. (citing Brideau v. Grissom, 120 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 1963); Goodstein v. Huffman, 222
S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App. 1949)).
157. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Realty Syndicate, Inc., 268 S.E.2d 494, 500 (N.C. 1980).
158. Id. at 494.
159. Id. at 496.
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restrictions were united textually with building restrictions, "the two
clauses [were] so clearly independent that one need not infect the
other.' 60 The court went on to justify its holding by expounding on the
value of protecting residential restrictions as a distinct and valuable
property right. 16 Like the court in Viking, the Hawthorne court reasoned
that those who purchase realty in reliance upon covenants should be enti-
tled to the benefit of such covenants where "its imposition [is] violative
of no rules of equity or public policy.' 162
Under the modem view, as revealed by a nationwide survey of
cases involving restrictive covenants since 1927, courts generally render
covenants unenforceable only "where there has been such a radical
change . . . that the original purpose of the covenant has been defeated
[thus being] no longer of substantial value to the benefited land, and its
enforcement would be unduly oppressive to the burdened land.' 63 Like-
wise, in Viking, the court followed a long-standing and favored policy of
"allowing property owners to protect their rights by entering into restric-
tive covenants," by interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of the
covenant without the racial restrictions.' 64 Ergo, policy in Washington is
much in line with other jurisdictions where the collective interests of
property owners are to be protected and where racially restrictive lan-
guage may be severed in order to allow the rest of the benefits to con-
tinue to operate.
V. CONCLUSION
While the last century saw the widespread introduction and equally
pervasive repeal of racially restrictive covenants, these covenants left an
unfortunate legacy within both the public record and in land titles. Given
the statutory language and common procedural practice-despite a lack
of published case law-the process of removing racially restrictive cove-
nants is a straightforward one. This legacy of race restriction, however, is
often bound up with legitimate beneficial covenants, which has compli-
cated the removal of these racially restrictive covenants, pitting exclu-
sionary language against landowner's interests. Today, in Washington's
post- Viking era, landowners are assured that the benefits of other cove-
nants associated with their land will not be invalidated due to a specific
160. Id. at 500.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, Change in Character of Neighborhood as Affecting
Validity or Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, 76 A.L.R. 5th 337, § 1 (a) (2000).
164. Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wash. 2d 112, 118 P.3d 322 (2005).
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challenge against a racially restrictive provision. At least, this is true for
textually separate, yet associated, covenants.
As a result, courts should allow excision from textually unified
covenants as well. Long standing policies of Washington courts allow
property rights to be protected by restrictive covenants, and policies ad-
vanced by the legislature allow for the removal of racial restrictions.
Thus, Viking indicates that Washington is in line with the jurisprudence
of other jurisdictions that allow racial restrictions to be excised in any
form. Regardless of why the Viking court highlighted the textual separa-
tion of the racially restrictive covenant, the result was just. Only by sev-
ering capricious racial provisions from textually unified covenants can
courts fully protect landowners' rights and effectuate current remedial
social policies of encouraging the removal of racially restrictive cove-
nants. Recently, the Washington legislature used specific language to
explain that "[t]he continued existence of these discriminatory covenants,
conditions, or restrictions is contrary to public policy" and that the pur-
pose of their action was to allow the removal of "all remnants of dis-
crimination."1 65 Consequently, not only would Washington courts inter-
pret the law in this fashion, but they should.
165. 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 269-70.
2007] 1117
